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It is not without reason that the United States of America is regarded as the first co-
untry to implement the idea of the separation of Church and state. One even refers 
to a specific American model of the secular state, also described as pure separation. 
This is a model characterised by the state displaying a certain favour towards religion 
despite the separation. This is also why the Catholic Church, which before the Second 
Vatican Council was fundamentally opposed to this type of solution, has been compa-
ratively positive in its response to the American secular state model. Pope Leo XIII, 
despite firmly rejecting as erroneous the principle of separation of Church and state, 
in the 1895 encyclical Longinqua oceani commended the American constitution and 
the state authorities’ actions regarding the Church as well as the form which the 
principle of separation of Church and state took in the United States. Yet he also 
argued that it would be wrong to conclude “that in America is to be sought the type 
of the most desirable status of the Church, or that it would be universally lawful or 
expedient for State and Church to be, as in America, dissevered and divorced.”1 The 
American model emerged in a unique religious, cultural, ethnic and political context, 
of course in response to the enormous diversity of confessions and nationalities in 
the fledgling country built by mostly European migrants. This made it essential to 
search for solutions that could prevent potential conflicts and also be used to build 
1 Longinqua, Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Catholicism in the United States, http://w2.vatican.va/
content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_06011895_longinqua.html [access: 27.02.2018].
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a cohesive state and one American nation. Less obvious is the fact that North America 
is characterised by state or quasi-state organisms of a religious or theocratic nature. 
Yet the American colonies – alongside tendencies to break with European heritage 
and the model of state-church relations dominant in the Old Continent involving 
a tighter or looser connection, which could be seen in the colonies of Rhode Island 
or Virginia, for instance – were characterised by attempts to introduce a confessional 
state model. This topic, about which much less is known and has been written, is 
the subject of Maciej Potz’s book. The first of two parts is theoretical and metho-
dological, and contains four chapters. The author explores issues of political power, 
with a particular emphasis on the key question of legitimation of power as well as 
the theocratic system. He also discusses the sacralisation of power and the origins 
and stability of theocratic power. He initially applies the conception of theocracy 
outlined in the first part in order to empirically analyse selected North American 
theocracies – the Puritans, Shakers and Mormons. Given the subject matter as well 
as the methodology employed, we can classify the book as an example of the political 
science of religion, which is regarded as a subdiscipline of religious studies or politi-
cal science, depending on the perspective taken by the researchers in question. While 
by no means distancing himself from the political science of religion, Potz does note 
that the research methods used in the book put it in the category of political science, 
as all elements of the study of religions are subordinated to researching theocracy as 
a political system. Moreover, he cites his ambition to establish the political science 
of religion as a fully-fledged subdiscipline of political science (p. 14). Such calls are 
not new, but previously they have tended to be made by practitioners of religious 
studies treating the political science of religion as a distinct field of research within 
their discipline.2 In recent years, though, political scientists have increasingly called 
attention to the need to establish and identify the political science of religion. Of co-
urse, one could debate the question of which discipline is the rightful home for such 
research, but it seems better to leave such problems to one side, as they are academic 
as well as rather futile exercises. We will always have the problem of such bounda-
ries – as shown by the fact that the sociology of religion is practised both by people 
calling themselves sociologists and by scholars of religious studies, or also by the 
similar cases of the psychology of religion and other subdisciplines. Especially in 
the case of such interdisciplinary fields as political science and religious studies, we 
will encounter difficulties in classifying research that takes place in the area where 
they overlap.
The four chapters of the first part are entitled: Chapter 1. Political Power; Chap-
ter 2. The Concept of Theocracy; Chapter 3. Sacralisation of Power; Chapter 4. 
The Origins and Stability of Theocratic Power. The author takes the opportunity to 
meticulously discuss the basic concepts and terms which he employs in the second, 
2 See K. Banek: Politologia religii jako dziedzina badań religioznawczych, “Przegląd Religioznaw-
czy” 1999, no. 3/4; Główne problemy politologii religii, “Nomos. Kwartalnik Religioznawczy” 2001, 
no. 34/36; B. Grott: Słowo wstępne [in:] Religia i polityka, B. Grott (ed.), Kraków 2000; Zamiast wstępu. 
Religioznawcze aspekty badań nad nowożytnymi nurtami ideowopolitycznymi [in:] Religia chrześcijań-
ska a idee polityczne, B. Grott (ed.), Kraków 1998.
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analytical-empirical part. Potz uses an interesting method for arranging his argu-
ments, giving them greater clarity and avoiding potential misunderstandings caused 
by various interpretations of terms. Following such scholars as Rodney Stark and 
William S. Bainbridge,3 he quasi-formalises the book with the help of a series of 
definitions and statements. This process, he argues, allows him to systematise the 
material, check its internal contradictions and avoid them, and empirically verify 
the hypotheses he makes by referring them to theocratic systems not discussed 
in the volume (p. 17). He identifies the primal concepts used for building definitions 
and claims which he does not define, such as: system, relation, society, religion, etc. 
The definitions are arbitrary, internally – i.e. within the system – consistent and non-
-tautological descriptions of studied objects, and, furthermore, are general in charac-
ter, i.e. pronouncing on a certain class of cases, and formulated in a way that enables 
them to be falsified (pp. 17–19). All these definitions and statements are presented 
separately within the course of the narrative and meticulously discussed and justi-
fied. As with Stark and Bainbridge, the author also lists them in an appendix. There 
is no doubt that this theoretical structure makes it easier to understand the hypotheses 
presented in it, makes the author’s arguments clearer and their logic more transpar-
ent, and minimises the danger of misunderstandings resulting from the use of specific 
concepts or their ambiguities. Potz makes use of them in the text in a specific, nar-
rowly defined sense, thereby protecting himself, as it were, from criticisms based on 
loose application of certain terms or using them in a journalistic or colloquial rather 
than an academic sense. This is extremely important in the delicate material that Potz 
covers; as we know, such terms as “authoritarianism,” “totalitarianism,” “theocracy” 
and “despotism” are often used very loosely, in a way that has little in common with 
their actual meaning. On the other hand, the question might arise of whether this 
theoretical section is not too extensive in comparison with the rest of the book. After 
all, it fills almost half the pages, especially if we discount the indexes, appendices 
and bibliography. Is such a detailed presentation of lengthy debates over the origin, 
meanings, characteristics, contents, and legitimisation of power really indispensable? 
Without doubt, there are also grounds for asking whether it would be more useful to 
place these reflections more firmly in the context of North American theocracies. 
Rather than dividing the book into two more or less equal parts, perhaps the more 
specific theoretical issues might have been woven further into the narrative, thus 
providing the reader with a greater insight into the author’s intentions and adding 
uniformity to the book. Of course, this is a matter of personal preferences; the author 
made certain decisions regarding his work’s layout and theoretical structure, and is 
successful in justifying his reasons in the introduction.
The chapters in the first part concerning theocracy, which the author attempts to 
restore as an analytical category in research on political systems, are particularly use-
ful. He rightly points to the weaknesses of the divisions that are most popular and 
common in the political sciences – into democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian sys-
tems. The problem with this typology is that it confuses two different criteria – pro-
cedural (answering the questions “who rules, and how is government established?”) 
3 R. Stark, W.S. Bainbridge, A Theory of Religion, New Brunswick, NJ 1996.
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and liberal (answering the question “what scope of freedom does the government 
leave to the individual?”). Yet a theocracy cannot be categorically classed in any of 
these systems, as various theocracies might feature diverse ways of forming the ap-
paratus of power and differing scopes of freedom. For Potz, theocratic government 
is distinguished by its religious legitimation, which does not necessarily mean that 
the clergy are in power (a hierocracy). He also points out that theocratic government 
usually differs from that based on non-religious justifications in terms of subordinate 
individuals having a higher level of acceptance of the legitimising formula, meaning 
that the component of legitimation is dominant over that of compulsion (p. 76). As 
a result, Potz endeavours to integrate theocracy within the theoretical models used for 
describing political systems, in order for it to be a useful analytical tool. To do this, 
he proposes constructing a typology of political systems taking three fundamental 
criteria into account: the procedure for coming to power and exercising it (democ-
racies and autocracies); sources of legitimisation of power (theocratic, traditional, 
meritocratic, contractual, despotic); and the level of political control or scope of in-
dividual freedom (liberal, authoritative, totalitarian). In this way, he identifies some 
thirty theoretical types of political systems, which are, of course, ideal types. This is 
certainly an interesting exercise, and above all one that ensures greater conceptual 
precision than one gets from well-worn existing terms, which today, unfortunately, are 
used mostly to valorise rather than to describe. It goes without saying that not only do 
many of Potz’s political systems not have designates in reality, but they are also hard 
to imagine – such as a traditional totalitarian democracy or a contractual totalitarian 
autocracy. As the author emphasises, however, this makes it possible to avoid safe but 
meaningless conceptual clichés like “democracy-freedom” or “autocracy-authoritari-
anism-despotism,” as there is no “logical, or even historically necessary, link between 
the way of coming to power and exercising it, the source of its legitimation and the 
scope of the people’s freedoms” (p. 85). This process allows various types of theocra-
cy to be distinguished, as there is more than one. In individual theocracies, there may 
be various levels of citizens’ freedoms and diverse ways in which power is taken and 
exercised. The adjective “theocratic” tells us only about the sources of legitimation of 
this power, and nothing else. Every theocracy is a confessional state, but the reverse 
is not true, as the contemporary Western world has a number of confessional states 
in a modernised version (the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark),4 in which the or-
ganisational affiliation of state and Church comes with a contractual, and not religious 
legitimation of power. Potz also made a typology of theocracies on the basis of the cri-
terion of who governs. He was therefore able to identify hierocracy, in which it is re-
ligious functionaries who are in power; papocaesarism, with parallel secular and cleri-
cal rule, the former being subordinate to the latter; and caesaropapism, characterised 
by secular government, but with a significant influence of the clergy and institutional 
separation – in this case, the government is solely secular, and religious functionaries 
have no public functions, yet do have a major influence on state affairs (pp. 90–91). In 
terms of the North American theocracies discussed in the second part of the book, the 
4 J. Krukowski, Kościół i państwo. Podstawy relacji prawnych, Lublin 1993, p. 55.
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Mormons and Shakers are part of a hierocratic system, and eighteenth-century Puritan 
colonies in America are an example of institutional separateness.
The interpretation of theocracy on the basis of social exchange theory is also in-
teresting. Potz shows that the participants of the exchange transaction in a theocracy 
are on the one hand religious functionaries and the secular rulers who have diverse 
relations with them, and on the other, subjects who belong to the same religion as 
the functionaries. The objects of social transactions are various types of religious 
resources, headed by the promise of salvation, which Stark and Bainbridge called 
compensators. In this perspective, emphasises Potz, the system of theocracy should 
be regarded as being of a rational nature. “For the governed, subservience is instru-
mentally rational, because the rulers are the best providers of the desired resources. 
In this sense, being subservient to them is not proof of fanaticism or blindness, but 
rather, firstly, a general belief in the legitimacy of power and the resultant obligations 
(one should be obedient to rulers), but also, secondly, perceiving the direct depend-
ence of one’s fate, including obtaining religious resources, on obedience” (p. 14). In-
cidentally, we could also look at this problem from another angle, and try to underline 
the rational nature of such behaviours. Evolutionary psychology demonstrates clearly 
that people belonging to a religiously cohesive community have greater chances of 
survival and producing progeny, and that the ritual practices often perceived as ex-
cessively expensive and irrational prove to be the best solution to the problem of 
cooperation without relatives. As Jonathan Haidt writes:
Our ability to believe in supernatural agents may well have begun as an accidental by-product 
of a hypersensitive agency detection device, but once early humans began believing in such 
agents, the groups that used them to construct moral communities were the ones that lasted and 
prospered. Like those nineteenth-century religious communes, they used their gods to elicit 
sacrifice and commitment from members. Like those subjects in the cheating studies and trust 
games, their gods helped them to suppress cheating and increase trustworthiness. Only groups 
that can elicit commitment and suppress free riding can grow.5
Potz analyses the religious doctrines of his selected groups, showing that they are 
very much functional regarding the political systems based on them, and that they as-
sured political stability and legitimation of leaders’ power. In the case of the Puritans, 
the religious-political idea of the covenant, with several dimensions – covenant of 
grace, church covenant and citizens’ covenant – was critical. This served to maintain 
the cohesion of a community based on a religiously secured worldview. For Mormons, 
meanwhile, the doctrine of continuous revelation played a strategic role. Unlike the 
Puritans of New England, who were among the first settlers and essentially had no 
external enemies, the Mormons faced a powerful foe in the shape of the federal gov-
ernment. Under its pressure, they were forced to abandon an important part of their 
doctrine, which was polygamy. The doctrine of continual revelation therefore showed 
its great worth, as they were able to use it to justify this step as well as later about-
turns in doctrine, maintain the necessary flexibility, and adapt the system as a result 
5 J. Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, New York 
2013, p. 317.
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of external pressures without harm to their legitimacy. Similarly, Mormon millenari-
anism, proclaiming the need to build God’s Kingdom on Earth, was only functional 
for a certain time, as long as it justified their efforts to migrate and settle Utah. At the 
point when assimilation with American society became necessary, however, it was 
abandoned. In the Shakers’ case, their non-apocalyptic and non-revolutionary millen-
nialism did not leave them exposed to confrontation with the outside world, and so 
they were able to function without hindrance, justifying the group’s rigorous internal 
disciplinary rules and its cultural and spatial isolation. In the subsequent chapters of 
the second part, Potz conducts a similar analysis of the differences in the succession 
procedures of each group, their evolution and the significance of their various forms 
for preserving the stability of the system. He then moves on to discuss the institution-
al dimension of the theocratic political systems created by the Puritans, Mormons and 
Shakers. Finally, he presents the question of the mechanisms of social control exerted 
by the government, especially legal regulations and the relevant sanctions. From the 
point of view of this criterion, he divides the discussed North American theocracies 
into authoritarian (Puritans, Mormons) and totalitarian (Shakers). Perhaps surprising-
ly, however, he also strongly emphasises – as we have already seen – that legitimised 
power is dominant over forms based on coercion. This is best seen with the example 
of the “totalitarian” Shakers, whose leaders de facto had no physical sanctions at their 
disposal, and yet succeeded in maintaining a surprising amount of group cohesion in 
terms of belief, conduct and aspirations. This was achieved by specifying in minute 
detail all obligations, permitted behaviours, rules of personal hygiene, breakdown 
of daily life, dress code and rules for furnishing a home, and giving them religious 
status, as well as by isolation from the outside world. As Tomasz Żyro writes, in this 
type of utopian community, the individual does not see the need 
[...] to go looking for and revealing instincts, asocial inclinations. In a utopian community, 
the essence of control is contained in the very social structure it establishes. A secondary role 
here was played by controlling the community member’s behaviour, time and space. A fixed 
daily routine, regularity of meals and rest pack experiences into a peaceful rhythm of enduring, 
far removed from the savage events “on the outside.” Isolation from the world facilitated the 
emergence of a time of internal utopia, completely different from the social time. [...] Even 
more capable was the imposition on the community member of a sense of collective space. [...] 
For ordinary sect members, it was practically only the internal space that existed: they seldom 
received permission to go beyond the community (moving only in pairs). As a result, the natural 
community for a believer was a space organised according to doctrine. This alienation, deli-
berate isolation and sense of mission were guaranteed by original outfits, secret language and 
secret names known only to a few.6
In conclusion, Maciej Potz’s book is an extremely valuable, and, in many re-
spects, pioneering work. The author tackles a whole array of problems which have 
not previously attracted the interest of researchers in Polish literature or have only 
been a marginal concern. By this, I mean in particular the conception of theocracy 
that he outlines and the attempt – successfully, in my opinion – to demonstrate that 
this can be a useful analytical category for researchers of the links between religion 
6 T. Żyro, Boża plantacja. Historia utopii amerykańskiej, Warszawa 1994, pp. 158–159.
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and the state and political power, which has extremely rarely been used. What seems 
useful in this sense is the demystification of certain concepts such as “theocracy,” 
which all too often today tend to be used as kinds of keywords or valorising concepts. 
Equally worthwhile is the identification of several types of theocracy, which shows 
that there is no such thing as theocracy per se. Various versions are in operation, with 
diverse ways of creating the apparatus of power and varying levels of state control 
over the life of the individual. This can all be useful – and not only for political sci-
entists or religious studies scholars of a historical bent, analysing previous theocratic 
systems. As Potz rightly explains in the conclusion, nowadays too, mostly in the 
Muslim world, there are diverse theocracies which ought to be the subject of acute 
interest from researchers. The author also convincingly shows that in certain condi-
tions, a theocracy can constitute a rational choice, i.e. guarantee the realisation of the 
objectives set by the community, fulfilling a state-forming role, providing cohesion 
to a specific group, and giving tools with which it is able to effectively oppose other 
rival doctrines. It therefore fulfils a functional role in a given community, and should 
not be treated solely in terms of an aberration or eruption of fanaticism. Purely from 
the point of view of religious studies, this book certainly fills gaps in the Polish 
subject literature on American puritanism (although the relatively largest amount of 
literature can be found on this movement), Mormonism, and, especially, Shakerism. 
There is almost no Polish literature on the Shakers, apart from a few fragmentary 
works. As for Mormonism, more literature exists, but unfortunately most publica-
tions have an ideological stamp and do not fulfil the criteria for objective scientific 
works. Finally, the book’s value is increased by its extremely clear and the author’s, 
let us say, elegant style and presentation. It is a transparent, coherent and eloquent ar-
gument, which brings order to many previously under-researched issues and clarifies 
a number of popular yet stereotypical, and often even jarringly banal views. This is 
certainly a scientifically mature, intellectually competent work, which penetrates and 
irons out an important set of issues that unfortunately are often “wrongly” presented 
in the Polish subject literature.
Translated by Ben Koschalka
